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Abstract 
Recently, several papers have shown that environmental taxes are more costly in an economy 
with preexisting distortions than in an undistorted economy. This result applies for equal 
percent reductions from different emission levels. We investigate the introduction of a 
common target emission level in such economies, and find that the restriction reduces the 
initial efficiency-difference between the economies; the two solutions may even coincide. 
Thus, it is less costly to achieve a target for environmental quality in the distorted economy. 
Our result complements the above-mentioned conclusions on environmental policy in 
economies with and without preexisting distortions. 
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1. Introduction 
Environmental taxation and green tax reforms have been studied extensively during the last 
few years. Many analyses have focused on the significance of pre-existing distortions for 
environmental policy. This particular topic became highly popular when the idea emerged that 
environmental taxes may yield a double dividend if the revenues from these taxes are used to 
reduce the rates of existing, distortionary taxes (cf. Pearce (1991)). 
Our contribution to this literature is motivated by a result obtained in three related 
studies by Goulder et al (1997), Parry et al (1999) and Goulder et al (1999), henceforth GP. In 
all three papers, the authors compare the marginal cost of emission reductions in cases with 
and without pre-exisiting, distortionary taxes.1 They find that the marginal cost schedules in 
the second best are located above the corresponding cost curves in first best (no prior taxes) 
economies, i.e., the marginal costs are highest for the economies with pre-existing taxes.2 This 
is an interesting and striking result, since it may be viewed as the antithesis of the original 
idea of a double dividend: Pre-existing tax distortions in fact make environmental regulation 
more costly than if the economy were in a first best situation. 
Rather than compute the marginal cost of per cent reductions from different initial 
emission levels, we analyse the welfare cost of imposing an emission target, i.e., a restriction 
on the emission level. We see two main reasons for this approach, one theoretical and one 
empirical. A positive analysis in order to understand the implications of a first vs. a second 
best starting point should observe that there are several differences between economies with 
and without pre-existing tax distortions – apart from the distortionary taxes themselves. In 
fact, the only common element in model solutions is the exogenous tax revenue requirement, 
while commodity prices, income, quantities of intermediate and final goods, and thereby also 
emission levels, differ. Our approach may be seen as a standard comparative statics exercise. 
We impose two restrictions, i) the total tax revenue must be greater than or equal to a revenue 
requirement, and ii) the emission level must be less than or equal to an emission target. We 
then study the effects of tightening the emission restriction given a revenue level. Since 
emissions in unregulated first- and second best economies differ, emissions in the first best 
being higher, the emission restriction ii) is initially non-binding in the second best economy.  
                                                 
1 Goulder et al (1997) consider SO2 emissions, Parry et al (1999) CO2 emissions, and Goulder et al (1999) NOx 
emissions. In all papers, a comparison of costs of emission reductions in first- and second best is only one of 
several interesting topics, but this particular topic is the one we focus on here. 
2 Cf. Figure 1 in Goulder et al (1997), Figure 1 in Parry et al (1999), and Figure 1 in Goulder et al (1999). 
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The observation that a second best setting leads to a lower emission level is fairly 
intuitive, and has been made before, see e.g. Lee and Misiolek (1986) and Schöb (1996, 
1997). This observation also relates to the result by Atkinson and Stern (1974) that one cannot 
infer from the modified Samuelson rule for distorted economies that the public good provision 
will be lower in a second best world compared to the provision in a first-best world. 
Considering environmental quality a public good provides the link. 
Our second motivation is that the costs from damages caused by emissions are related 
to the levels of emissions and not percentage reductions. Viewing a static model as a reduced 
form representation of an intertemporal reality with feedbacks from a damaged environment, 
the emission level provides the more relevant indicator or target. Of course, present political 
negotiations over who should reduce their emissions by how much are phrased in terms of 
percentage reductions. The long-term issue, however, seems to be an evaluation of what 
would be the optimal emission level or time profile of emissions.  
 Our main result is that the additional welfare cost in a second best economy compared 
to a first best economy becomes smaller the tighter the emission restriction. The intuition is 
quite simple. At the outset, without binding restrictions on emissions, tax revenues stem from 
entirely different tax bases. In the undistorted economy there is a lump sum tax, while in the 
distorted economy there is a tax on labour income. A revenue-neutral, green tax reform 
provides a common tax base which, roughly speaking, makes the two tax solutions more 
similar. In principle, the two solutions may coincide. This would be the case when the 
revenue from the emission tax meets the revenue requirement, which would obtain when both 
the emission target and the revenue requirement are sufficiently low. The introduction of an 
emission restriction therefore leads to efficiency-convergence between the undistorted and the 
distorted economies. This result confirms an observation made by Sandmo (1995). He argued 
that the substitution of environmental taxes for pre-existing distortionary taxes might remove 
the excess burden completely. (See also Oates (1995).) We demonstrate this result in Figure 2 
below.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Chapters 2 and 3 we lay the 
theoretical basis from public finance. In particular, we introduce notation in Chapter 3 in 
order to make the interpretation of our results precise. Chapter 4 reports on our numerical 
analysis from the CGE model by Parry et al (1999).3 Finally, Chapter 5 concludes. 
                                                 
3 An appendix containing our coding of their model in the MPSGE/GAMS-format is available from the authors. 
Running this model reproduces both their results  and ours. 
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2. Theoretical foundations 
We have re-established the numerical model in Parry et al (1999). This is an eight-sector 
CGE-model of the US economy involving only a few alternative tax instruments. It is an easy 
task to compute the first- and second best solutions of the model, and it suits our goals nicely. 
Furthermore, re-using Parry et al’s model facilitates direct comparisons with their results. We 
do not believe that the qualitative aspects of our results are specific to this particular model, 
however. 
In their model economy the Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) production efficiency theorem 
is assumed to hold. There are constant returns to scale, zero pure profits, and no taxes on 
intermediate inputs. Second best optimal taxes are therefore levied on the household’s supply 
of labour and demand for final consumption goods. Let tL, tI, and tN denote tax rates on labour 
income and consumption of an energy- intensive respectively a non-energy- intensive 
consumption good, which are the final consumption goods in the model. 4 Since there is no 
pure profit, one of the tax rates may without loss of generality be zero, cf. Munk (1978). 
Choosing tI = 0, the tax instruments are tL and tN. The assumed preference structure, where 
leisure is weakly separable from the consumption aggregate, implies that the two consumption 
goods have the same degree of complementarity to to leisure, whereby a second-best optimal 
tax rate on non-energy- intensive consumption is zero. Before we introduce the emission 
target, the tax solutions of the model follow from the tax revenue requirement,  
 ,Lt L a G+ ³  (1) 
where L denotes labour supply, a denotes a lump sum tax, and G is an exogenous income 
transfer to the representative consumer. Throughout the computations, the transfer is kept 
constant in real terms, i.e., GR = G/pU is constant, where pU is the ideal price index 
representing the true cost of living (the unit expenditure function). In the second-best solution, 
we assume that the lump sum tax is infeasible, such that tLL = G. In other words, the second 
best tax rate is a function of the exogenous parameter G, i.e., ( ).SBLt G  Likewise, the first best 
tax solution follows from a = G, i.e., aFB(G).  
Let e denote total carbon emissions from all production and consumption activities. 
When such emissions are regulated by a tax rate te, the tax system must fulfil the following 
two restrictions: 5 
                                                 
4 For further details concerning the model, see Appendix A. 
5 Equation (A4) in the appendix includes a tax on pure profits in addition to the labour income tax, the emission 
tax and the lump sum tax as shown in (2). Pure profits are zero in the unrestricted reference, but become positive 
 4
 
,
.
L et L a t e G
e E
+ + ³
£
 (2) 
E denotes the target level for total emissions. The second best tax solution now involves a 
labour income tax in combination with an emission tax, and the optimum tax rates are then 
functions of the two exogenous parameters G and E, { }( , ), ( , ) .SB SBL et G E t G E  By analogy, the 
first best solution is denoted { }( , ), ( , ) .FB FBea G E t G E   
 
3. Welfare costs and excess burden 
The total excess burden caused by distortionary taxation measures how much better off the 
representative consumer would have been if the same amount of tax revenue were collected 
by means of non-distortionary finance. Pauwels (1986) shows that the equivalent variation 
when going from a first best to a distortionary equilibrium (raising the same amount of 
revenue) represents a correct measure of the total excess burden. Let (pFB,IFB) denote the first 
best consumer prices and non- labour income level, V(p,I) the indirect utility function, UFB= 
V(pFB,IFB) the first best utility level, and Ui the utility level in a state of the economy which is 
compared to the first best solution. Pauwels’ equivalent variation measure of the excess 
burden may then be found from the following equation, 
 ( , ) .FB iV I EV U- =FBp  (3) 
Let us first consider the situation without an emission target, where (1) is the only restriction 
on the choice of tax rates. Denoting the second best prices and non- labour income by 
(pSB,ISB), we have that USB =  V(pSB,ISB). The total excess burden (EV) in (3) is determined by 
how much better off the consumer is in the first best than in the second best equilibrium. 
Thus, EV is positive whenever UFB > Ui =USB. Since the consumer prices, non- labour income, 
and utility level are functions of the exogenous parameter G in (1), we introduce the 
shorthand notation UFB(G) = V(pFB(G),IFB(G)) and USB(G) = V(pSB(G),ISB(G)), such that the 
equivalent variation in (3) also may be expressed as a function of G, EV(G). If the 
government raised no taxes, G = 0, we would have that UFB = USB, and EV(0) = 0. When the 
revenue requirement is positive, the welfare level in the second best economy becomes 
smaller than in the undistorted first best economy, such that UFB >USB, and EV(G) > 0.  
                                                                                                                                                        
in the event that grandfathered quotas are used. For expositional simplicity, we have ignored that possibility 
here, since our focus primarily is on the implications of using a carbon tax to reduce emissions. 
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Our primary concern in this paper is how the welfare level and the welfare difference between 
a first and second best economy are affected by introducing a constraint on the total emission 
level. Since the optimal tax solutions then are derived from (2) instead of (1), consumer 
prices, non- labour income, and utility levels become functions of the two exogenous 
parameters G and E. Hence, we introduce the notation UFB(G,E) = V(pFB(G,E),IFB(G,E)) and 
USB(G,E) = V(pSB(G,E),ISB(G,E)) for the first- and second best utility levels, respectively.6  
We maintain the unrestricted first best solution as the reference from which all welfare 
costs are derived, and UFB(G) is the reference utility level. The first best welfare cost of 
reducing the emission level to E is denoted EVFB(G,E). It is implicitly defined from EV in (3) 
by setting Ui = UFB(G,E). By analogy, the second best welfare cost of reducing the emission 
level to E and raising revenue G is denoted EVSB(G,E), and is defined from (3) by setting Ui = 
USB(G,E). The welfare cost of reducing emissions in the second best is then EVSB(G,E) - 
EV(G); i.e., the welfare cost of meeting both restrictions minus the welfare cost due to second 
best financing of the revenue requirement only.  
We now arrive at a measure of the welfare difference between the first- and second 
best economies contingent upon the levels of G and E, viz., EVSB(G,E) – EVFB(G,E). This 
measure extends Pauwels’ excess burden to a situation where the tax policy pursues 
environmental goals in addition to the traditional role of raising revenue. When the restriction 
e £ E is non-binding in neither first nor second best, EVSB(G,E) – EVFB(G,E) equals EV(G).  
Our main result is that the welfare difference between the first- and second best 
economies diminishes as the emission target E is reduced. The intuition is quite simple. Let 
eFB and eSB denote the unrestricted emission levels in the first- and second best economies, 
respectively. Since the first best economy is more efficient, the total activity level is higher, 
which normally implies that eFB > eSB. This is indeed the case in the numerical model studied 
in the next section. Starting from the point where the emission restriction starts to bind in the 
first best economy, E = eFB, the first best utility level falls as E is reduced, while the second 
best utility level is maintained until E reaches eSB. In the range from eFB to eSB the welfare 
difference thus is reduced with E. Reducing E further, we find that the welfare difference 
continues to fall. If the revenues from the emission tax are sufficient to fulfil the requirement, 
the tax solutions and utility levels in the first- and second best economies coincide, whereby 
(3) implies that the welfare difference is zero. This possibility arises for sufficiently low levels 
of G and E, see Figure 2 below. 
                                                 
6 The utility level is defined exclusive of environmental quality; we only study utility from private consumption 
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4. Numerical results 
Compared to the first best economy, a labour income tax rate of 40% reduces the labour input 
by 13,2% and implies a welfare loss or an excess burden EV(G) of 116.5 billion dollars. This 
amounts to approximately 2.5% of the full endowment income in the second-best benchmark 
equilibrium. Total emissions in the first and second-best equilibria are 1639 respectively 1424 
million tons.7  
Impose now a restriction on total emissions, e £ E, where E is stipulated at 1639 
million tons, and consider the effects from reducing E in steps. For each step we compute the 
welfare cost in terms of the equivalent variation from the unrestricted first best equilibrium. 
See Figure 1. The constraint binds immediately in the first best, while it remains slack in 
second best until E attains the benchmark level of 1424. At E = 1424, the emission tax in the 
first best causes a reduction of the utility from leisure and consumption goods. The second-
best equilibrium is unaffected at this emission level, i.e., EVFB(G,E) > 0 while EVSB(G,E) = 
EV(G). By reducing the cap further, both equilibria are affected. Figure 1 shows the effects on 
welfare costs of reducing the emission level from the initial unrestricted first-best level e = 
1639 to e = 900.  
As a digression, consider grandfathered quotas. This instrument is no different than 
using taxes in the first-best economy. In the second best, however, it implies an extra welfare 
cost, measured as the equivalent variation from (3). In Figure 1, the equivalent variation of 
grandfathered quotas is denoted EVSB(G,E)grandfathered. 
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Figure 1. Welfare costs and welfare difference when reducing emissions  
                                                                                                                                                        
goods and leisure. 
7 For each activity, the model employs a fixed coefficient of carbon content. Thus, higher activity levels come 
with higher total emissions.  
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The first-best welfare cost of reaching the emission target E  = 900 is 80.4 billion dollars, 
indicated by the lowermost arrow in Figure 1. The welfare cost of obtaining the same 
emission target in the second-best version of the model, however, is the differential cost of 
43.8 billion dollars, EVSB(G,E) - EV(G) = 160.3 – 116.5, as indicated by the uppermost arrow, 
and not the entire 160.3. Thus, for this emission level the welfare cost of regulating the 
second-best economy amounts to only a little more than half the cost of regulating in the first-
best setting.  
The welfare difference EVSB(G,E) – EVFB(G,E) can be read from Figure 1 as the 
vertical distance between the curves EVSB(G,E) and EVFB(G,E). The isolated effect on 
economic efficiency of a labour income tax of 40% is captured by the initial excess burden 
EV(G) of 116.5 billion dollars. As a binding emission target E constrains the use of polluting 
inputs, the welfare difference diminishes. At E = 900, the welfare difference is reduced to 
79.8 billion dollars. This is when the revenue-recycling effect – using the carbon tax revenue 
to cut the labour income tax rate – is exploited. If a carbon revenue is not used to reduce pre-
existing distortionary taxes, however, as is the case when using grandfathered quotas, the 
welfare difference between the first best and the EVSB(G,E)grandfathered is 107.7 billion dollars. 
Thus, regulating emissions by means of grandfathered quotas inflicts an extra welfare cost 
compared to a regulation with emission tax or auctioned quotas. At E  = 900, this additional 
welfare cost amounts to 27.9 billion dollars, or almost 65% over and above the welfare cost of 
the carbon tax.  
 
Full efficiency-convergence 
The insight provided by the above computations may become even more transparent if we 
modify one parameter of the model, namely the level of tax revenue. Assume that the labour 
tax rate is 20% and not 40%, and that the governmental revenue requirement is reduced 
accordingly. Let us redo the experiment of reducing the emission cap from its maximum, 
which still is 1639. Because of the reduced tax rate, the distortion from taxation in second best 
is smaller, and the excess burden of the unregulated second-best economy, EV(G), is reduced 
from 116.5 to 21.4 billion dollars. The overall activity level in second best is now larger and 
results in total emissions of 1551 million tons.  
Figure 2 displays the welfare difference EVSB(G,E) – EVFB(G,E) as a function of the 
emission target. At E = 658 million tons, the emission tax is sufficient to generate the 
governmental revenue requirement. Therefore, the reform of replacing the labour tax with an 
environmental tax coincides with the first-best solution to environmental regulation at this 
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particular level of G and E.8 The two model economies are equally efficient and provide the 
same welfare. Thus, the initial welfare difference between the first- and second best 
economies of 21.4 billion dollars is not only reduced, it disappears completely if the emission 
level is reduced to E = 658.  
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Figure 2. Welfare difference as a function of the emission target E .  
 
 
Also here, we have included the welfare difference from using a grandfathered quota instead 
of a carbon tax. We observe that grandfathered quotas provide only a small efficiency-
convergence, which is because this regulatory instrument does not exploit the benefits of 
revenue recycling. In stead of being reduced in the example of Figure 2, the labour income tax 
rate increases from the initial rate of 20% to 22% as the carbon emissions are reduced from 
1551 to 658 million tons.9 
 
                                                 
8 This is essentially Sandmo’s observation, see Sandmo (1995). 
9 Actually, it is misleading to speak of gradfathered quotas as a second-best instrument. This intrument is strictly 
dominated by either a carbon tax or auctioned quotas. A solution obtained by a combination of a labour tax and 
grandfathered quotas thus belongs to the class of third best or less-than-second-best solutions. 
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5. Concluding comments 
This paper has investigated the costs of imposing emission restrictions in economies with and 
without pre-existing distortive taxes. We have found that the efficiency difference between 
these economies diminishes as a consequence of such an emission restriction. The revenue 
generated by the emission tax replaces the initial taxes of these economies, thus making their 
tax bases more similar. A more ambitious emission target implies that a higher fraction of 
total tax revenues will stem from emission taxes. Thus, the initial difference between the 
distorted and non-distorted economy is reduced. 
 Sandmo (1995) and Oates (1995) made similar points. It should be noted, however, 
that their setting was that of optimal Pigouvian taxation, i.e., the correction of an external 
cost. Our analysis considers neither external costs nor benefits from an improved 
environment. It solely focuses on the cost of complying with the regulation, and it is the 
introduction of a common emission level that causes efficiency convergence between the 
economies. This result is impossible to read from GP’s analyses. In fact, one might easily get 
the opposite idea. In this respect, our paper complements their results, and hopefully 
contributes to a more complete understanding of the differences between the first and the 
second best.  
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Appendix A. The model of Parry et.al. (1999) 
 
There are six intermediate goods; coal (FC), petroleum (FP), natural gas (FN), electricity (E), 
other energy-intensive intermediate goods (I), and non-energy- intensive intermediate goods 
(N). Further, there are two final consumption goods: an energy- intensive good (CI), and a non-
energy-intensive good (CN). Production of intermediate and final goods are described by 
constant returns nested CES production functions, and each producer takes input and output 
prices as given. Labour is input to the production of the six intermediate goods, while the two 
final goods are aggregates of intermediate inputs only.  
 There is a representative consumer with preferences over leisure (l) and the two final 
goods, expressed by the utility function 
 ( , ( , )).I NU l f C C  (A1) 
sh and sf denote the elasticities of substitution between l and f(×), respectively CI and CN. The 
consumer maximises U subject to the budget constraint 
 (1 ) (1 ) ,+ = - + - + -
I NC I C N L L R
p C p C p L t t G ap  (A2) 
where L = L - l is labour supply, tL and tR are tax rates on labour and rent income respectively, 
G is transfer income, which throughout the analyses is kept constant in real terms, and a is a 
lump sum tax. In the reference equilibrium (without a carbon restrictions), there is no pure 
profit, p  = 0. When, however, the government uses grandfathered quotas to restrict emissions, 
p  represents the quota rents that accrue to the private sector. It is assumed that tR = tL. 
 Carbon emissions stem from the use of coal, natural gas, and petroleum. Each of these 
has a fixed carbon emission coefficient b i, i = FC, FN, FP, such that total carbon emissions (e) 
becomes   
 .= + +
C N PF C F N F P
e F F Fb b b  (A3) 
The government’s budget constraint equalises total tax revenues (REV) with the lump sum 
transfer (G), 
 = + + + =L R eREV a t L t t e Gp . (A4) 
Under a carbon tax (te) , p  = 0, while under a grandfathered quota, te = 0. In first-best tax 
solutions, the lump sum tax a is used, while tL is zero. The opposite is the case in second-best 
solutions, where we assume that lump sum financing cannot be used, such that the tax revenue 
requirement must be met by a combination of tL, tR, and te.  
 The benchmark data set is collected from Parry et al’s Table 1, which represents an 
approximation to the US economy in 1995. The data and the elasticities of substitution in the 
various CES aggregates are restated an appendix which is available from the authors. 
